Tag: World War 2

Why was the A-Bomb Used?

Thomas Bland

J. Robert Oppenheimer and other leading physicists took part in the Manhattan Project during the Second World War, which led to the first atomic bomb being dropped in the history of the world. To gauge the question on whether or not the U.S. should have dropped two atomic bombs on Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there needs to be a clear understanding on the history of this argument. One decision needed to be made, either having the atomic bomb as a threat or using the atomic bomb for the means of mass destruction. Physicists such as Oppenheimer and Albert Einstein felt that during the 1940s, during and after World War II, that this atomic bomb dropping would start a chain reaction amongst nations that would lead to a worldwide arms race. Decades later historian writers such as Richard Rhodes and Anthony Brown understood the use of the atomic bombs would prove costly as their years of research post-World War II examine how the after effects of nuclear sickness and nuclear warfare would outweigh the benefits of immediately ending World War II with the use of an atomic bomb.  When it came to the person who would have to make this decision, President Harry Truman decided to drop the first bomb on a Japanese city to justify the amount of time and money invested into the Manhattan project, while also ending the war immediately. With that being said, many questioned the usage of this bomb and with the primary sources and monographs acquired for this paper, there is a clear argument for the decisions made by Harry Truman. I will argue that Harry Truman wanted to use the bomb for an unnecessary desire to end World War II against a weak Axis powered alliance, and that Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted possession of the bomb to avoid the continuation of World War II and a future arms race.  

            Secondary educational history teachers would use this topic to show students how an inquiry-based question can be formed and answered. It is not the topic per say that is the focus for students, rather the ability to take an event/argument from our history and make it into a different argument based off of the research conducted. Once students realize that factual evidence allows history to be picked apart and formed into a new argument, their possibilities are unlimited. With this topic in mind, the U.S. can conclude that FDR had the desire to drop the atomic bomb on Nazi Germany and any other strong Axis Powers that was an immediate threat to the U.S. nation. FDR knew the ability of the atomic bomb and would not have dropped it unless it was needed. When Truman entered office after the death of FDR, he was clueless on the power of the atomic bomb. That is not an understatement, Harry Truman did not have nearly enough information on the atomic bomb as FDR did. Thus, for the reasons listed below, I believe FDR would not have dropped the atomic bomb on the two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  

            While arguing that Harry Truman wanted to use the bomb for an unnecessary desire to end World War II against a weak Axis powered alliance, and that Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted possession of the bomb to avoid the continuation of World War II and a future arms race, there needs to be an understanding of all information about this argument. During the creation of the bomb there were already questions regarding the atomic bomb dropping decision because Nazi Germany looked weak. Throughout the end of World War II physicists such as Oppenheimer and Edward Teller suggested to take caution with this decision not only on the fact that citizens would die, but that the U.S. would start the means of a different type of warfare. Looking forward to a decade later in the late 50s, historians such as Michael Armine argued Truman didn’t take the proper precautionary measures and this led to what all physicists feared, a different means of warfare. As mentioned above, historians Richard Rhodes and Anthony Brown studied the bomb droppings and published their views 50 years after the bombing of the two Japanese cities. They saw firsthand how the fears Oppenheimer and Teller had become true and that the U.S. lived in fear for decades after. Within many pieces of evidence found within this question, came caution that many made President Truman aware of. Truman, who was left in the dark about the atomic bomb until a few months before dropping one, had the means to end World War II without looking at the consequences. FDR had the means to use this bomb, when need be, a decision he would have gone against due to many memorandums and petitions received about the dangers of this atomic bomb. It is obvious the Allied powers would have won without these bombs, there were other strategies to be made such as naval blockades. These alternate strategies would have saved hundreds of thousands of Japanese citizens. 

            Harry Truman was born in Lamar, Missouri and served as a captain in the Field Artillery during World War I. Truman was born into independence as his family were farmers who relied on agriculture to survive. His political career started as a county judge and twenty years later in 1934 was elected to the U.S. Senate. In this new role, he supported President Roosevelt’s New Deal programs, which aimed to remove any continuation of the Great Depression in America.

When the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt came about, Truman became the 33^rd president of the U.S. and during this time authorized the first and only use of atomic bombs in warfare.^[1]

Harry Truman’s decision to drop two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has led to a question concerning his credibility to make this decision with such limited knowledge of the atomic bomb with its many deadly and consequential outcomes. The development of the atomic bomb was studied from start to finish by historians; a cause for concern was the fact that the leading moderator, Franklin D. Roosevelt, died before the decision of dropping any atomic bombs was made. The historiography of this study changes as more information and opinions are formed. Moreover, as one could imagine it was a split decision among politicians in 1945, regarding the employment of the atomic bomb. 

As for the people, things were different in the aftermath of the dropping of the atomic bomb. Studies showed that a Gallup poll taken after the two bombs were dropped in August 1945 found that 85 percent of Americans supported the bombings, 10 percent were opposed to them, and 5 percent had no opinion. Directly after the two bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the citizens of America supported Truman’s decision on ending World War II. The lack of evidence and knowledge from the average American citizen in 1945 was alarming, due to the fact that many physicists such as J. Robert Oppenheimer, Albert Einstein, and Leo Szilard felt this decision would lead to the loss of innocent civilian lives, as well as the emergence of the threat of nuclear warfare. It’s also interesting to think about this situation because a serious cause for concern was civilian causalities, yet the citizens of the U.S. still believed the bombing of these Japanese cities was justified.

  During the summer of 1945 there was no shortage of information for civilians as the Szilard Petition made headway before any bombs were dropped by the U.S. The Szilard Petition was created by Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard and tried to show how the development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction. The atomic bomb at the disposal of the U.S. or any given nation threatens the existence of the whole world. Not to mention its destructive power it poses during the creation of the atomic bomb. Szilard writes this petition and agrees that the atomic bomb shouldn’t be used because the U.S. is opening the door on a new era of warfare, thus leading to mass destruction on an unimaginable scale. This petition suggests a warning to the U.S. government as the stage will be set for nuclear warfare in the future. Not only will the stage be set, but the U.S. will have the responsibility for this. With that being said, Szilard will ask President Truman the following, “in view of the foregoing, we, the undersigned, respectfully petition that you exercise your power as Commander-in-Chief, to rule that the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war…”^[2] Politicians suggested to Truman to wait on a Japanese response after the U.S. accounted they have this weapon. Even from the beginning opinions were split in the summer of 1945, one that led to the decision to drop the first atomic bomb on an opposing nation. 

With the information above that Franklin D. Roosevelt had on the atomic bomb there was a greater chance he would have used the atomic bomb more as a visual threat, letting other nations view the power the U.S. possessed, as opposed to actually using the atomic bomb. Many questioned Truman, as even during his own presidency interim committee camp reports written by Oppenheimer himself to President Truman explained how he should “protect the world,” instead of showing a lust for power over other rivaled nations. Oppenheimer writes directly to President Truman in a memorandum and “recommends that before the weapons are used not only Britain, but also Russia, France, and China be advised that we have made considerable progress in our work on atomic weapons…”^[3] In Oppenheimer’s direct message to President Truman he’s not only arguing the use of the atomic bomb, but emphasizing the importance of letting other nations know what their plans are so cause less conflict in the world. Oppenheimer, as well as Szilard, let the president know they are open for helping out with this issue as an improvement of international relations would greatly help their war efforts. With Truman’s decision on dropping the two atomic bombs, he was criticized for not making the decision as a whole when it came to the allied powers during World War II. This situation connects back to the statement that Truman wanted to use the bomb on another nation, while FDR wanted the bomb to strictly send a message. A memorandum was sent to Truman, after the death of FDR. Historians argue FDR would have agreed with the first half of this message as “Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced.”^[4] The reasoning behind this belief is because FDR’s goal was to use the bomb on a powerful Nazi Germany nation and Japan if that decision needed to be made. Historians argue that Truman, along with others, “emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use…”⁵ Truman believed that the action being made on bombing Japanese cities would eliminate the threat as a whole, thus saving American lives. Truman and other believers of the atomic bomb want to use this technology as a demonstration to other nations that they have a powerful weapon. The U.S. saw no other means towards the end of World War II and thought that this direct military use was the way to go. With the use of this primary source above, a split developed as demonstrated by the two different sides of the argument, thus concluding FDR wanted the bomb to show as a threat, while Truman wanted to use the bomb no matter what the consequences.

  Harry Truman’s decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki, led to a question concerning his credibility to make this decision with such limited knowledge of the atomic bomb with its many deadly and consequential outcomes. Looking ahead to over a decade later in the year 1960, which is also the date of publication of my first monograph, the examination and history of the dropping of the atomic bomb has changed as the historiography is affected by more information. A growing number of citizens along with other politicians and physicists disagreed with Truman’s decision once they received reports on the destruction and number of casualties in Japan, as well as the rising threat of nuclear war. There was a clear understanding that the atomic bomb was an “absolute weapon” and one that would be produced around the world by other threating nations. 

With this additional information, there’s a desire to examine the information Franklin D. Roosevelt had on this bomb and how his decision may have differed from Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb twice. There’s evidence that leans towards this decision not being made by FDR as other physicists such as Niels Bohr who wrote to President Roosevelt in a memorandum stating that, “it certainly surpasses (atomic energy) the imagination of anyone to survey the consequences of the project in years to come…” Bohr says this to President Roosevelt to show his skepticism on what the physicists have created as this power source is nothing they’d ever had. Not only that, but Bohr writes to President Roosevelt in fear that in the long run, other nations will obtain this power. Other nations with the means of mass destruction or world domination. Regardless of whether other nations create the bomb, the actual making and testing of the bomb is dangerous enough. This message itself doesn’t focus on the dangers of the atomic bomb, Bohr talks about the threat the bomb holds by simply possessing it, along with other nations who have different ideological goals for their prosperity. This was a direct message to President Roosevelt and with these primary sources there is clear evidence that backs the argument President Roosevelt wanted this bomb for the threat alone. With the information President Roosevelt received about the deadly power of the atomic bomb, such as nuclear fission, impurities, and uranium, one would argue his decision would differ from Truman’s.

Physicists also argued against Truman about the containment of this bomb and how a chain reaction can be caused in two ways. One way being with a mass explosion that destroys the world, and the other chain reaction is the actions taken by other nations. Ever since the possibilities of releasing atomic energy on a vast scale came in sight, “much thought has naturally been given to the question of control… The terrifying prospect of a future competition between nations about a weapon of such formidable character can only be avoided through a universal agreement in true confidence.”^[5] A decade and a half later the historiography on the opinions of the bomb being dropped has changed due to additional information being provided to the historians and the public, leading to the opinions of the citizens from 1945 changing with regards to Truman’s decision.  This historiography on Truman’s decision to drop the bomb continues to change over the years, leading to a question of his credibility in making this decision with such limited knowledge of the atomic bomb with its many deadly and consequential outcomes. Looking ahead three decades later to the 1990s, which is also the year of my second monograph, the opinions of the people are essentially evenly split, differing from years in the past where one side was heavily favored over the other. By 1995, fifty years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many American citizens supported an alternative decision, other than the atomic bomb dropping. Americans felt if the decision was left up to them to drop the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, half said they would try another way. It took 50 years to split these opinions, arguably because they read about the mass terror that struck throughout Japan on Japanese citizens. However, the other half of respondents still agree with the atomic bomb droppings. This other half that supported the atomic bomb droppings also supported President Truman’s thought process because they felt the over desire to end World War II. There’s no argument against this thought process as it was a long war for the U.S., however Japan was a dying nation towards the end of World War II. The U.S. would have blocked Japan from the outside world with naval blockades and starved them.

There were other ways to end the war instead of nuking these two cities and creating a mass genocide. The argument needed to be made in this situation was if this bombing was justified. U.S. citizens are understanding this decision more as time goes on and it is seen with the changing of opinions of the people in the U.S. In 1945, 85% of citizens supported the bomb dropping, and in the 90s, it dropped down to more than half of U.S. citizens. This percentage dropped due to time; historians were able to form more opinions on the direct impact of the atomic bomb dropping. There was a fear of nuclear warfare that was imagined back in 1945, now being in the1990s the U.S. experienced the Cold War, and the impact of a decision made almost fifty years ago. 

Taking a different approach to this opinion matters; the thoughts of physicists and politicians are important but a complete approach to this must also focus on a military mindset. Military strategist Bernard Brodie believed that “the urgency of finding solutions to the transitional problem created by the atomic bomb was present…”^[6] A solution to this matter would be to put polices on place, ones that protect the nation under any future atomic attacks. Certain circumstances can arise in the future and the best course of action the U.S. can take is having protection. This is why historians and physicists would disagree with Truman’s decision because the cons outweigh the pros, possibility a nuclear war. Brodie would agree with this statement. The historiography changes throughout the fifty years post-World War II, showing the effect that historians have on pivotal matters in U.S. history. This leads to understanding why one would believe Truman’s decision was undesirable and dangerous, while a decision by Franklin D. Roosevelt would have led to a different, more favorable outcome. 

Harry Truman’s decision to drop two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, led to a question of his credibility to make this decision with such limited knowledge of the atomic bomb with its many deadly and consequential outcomes. A 2015Pew Research Center surveyfinds that 56% of the American population believe that the use of the two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities was a justified action, while 34% say this action was terrible. However, the divide between opinions is specific, it deals with age. Not surprisingly, there is a division between the ages of Americans 65 and older and the other percent being the age of 20s. About seven-in-ten Americans above the age of 65 agree the use of the atomic bombs were justified, while the younger generation, around 47%, argue this was an unfit action. With this information there is evidence of an age gap between those who believe the U.S. should or should not have dropped the bomb on the Japanese cities. With more information accessed by a younger generation the more they can see the unwillingness of Truman to realize the future of the U.S. could be in danger. This unwillingness from Truman to realize the future damage stemmed from the desire to put an immediate end to World War II. 

From a historical perspective, the historiography continues to change as the decision to bomb the two Japanese cities was unpopular, and Truman knew this based on a letter he received from physicists within the Manhattan Project. In a petition to Present Truman they wrote, “We are not to resort to the use of atomic bombs in the present phase of the war, at least not unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan after the war are publicly announced and subsequently Japan is given an opportunity to surrender.”^[7] This was certainly a popular opinion, especially because as the decades went on many historians questioned if Truman gave Japan enough time to surrender, as they only gave Japan three days to assess this new power. Many historians say no, and most physicists say no because they know that atomic bombs are primarily a means for the ruthless annihilation of cities and nations get rid of one quote. Thus, putting the factor of atomic warfare into the world, putting every nation at risk. 

With this information on hand there is a clear argument to be made that Harry Truman wanted to use the bomb for an unnecessary desire to show power against power-house nations, including the Soviet Union, and that Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted possession of the bomb to avoid the continuation of World War II and a future arms race. The development of the atomic bomb was important for an American and Allied victory in World War II, however at this point it is well known that atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction. With this information in the hands of the President of the United States, it’s hard to believe there was still a decision needed to be made. With the people of the U.S. now having this information completely in the 2000s, the 85% of people who supported the bomb dropping in 1945 dropped down to about half the people. With a president like Franklin D. Roosevelt, one who had great connection in the Manhattan Project, there would have been a more logical decision.       As historians continue to study the decisions made on the atomic bomb, the more histography changes over the decades. Harry Truman wanted to use the bomb for an unnecessary desire to show power against power-house nations, including the Soviet Union, and Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted possession of the bomb to avoid the continuation of World War II and avoid a future arms race. The differing opinions of historians over a 50-year span is shown through different books. British historian Anthony Brown’s book, The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1997), gives insight on the making and science behind the atomic bomb during the Manhattan Project, while also emphasizing the importance of security amongst the physicists on the testing site. During the Manhattan Project, Brown found the security within the testing site to be key for the protection of this device and the U.S.

The science behind the bomb such as nuclear fission, impurities, and uranium led Brown to argue this great power needed to be kept in check, and most importantly in the hands of the U.S. elites. While Brown’s book talks about the science behind the bomb, science writer Michael Armine’s monograph, The Great Decision (1959), dives into the question of whether Truman wanted to have the bomb for the wrong reasons, resulting in his dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There was growing insight into the fact that Truman was left in the dark during the making of the atomic bomb, leading historians to ask if this was a premature decision to end the war or show the power he possessed.

Lastly, American historian Richard Rhodes’ monograph, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), talks about how having an atomic bomb, and its threat, is different than using it on another nation. The threat of nuclear warfare was too great, leading Rhodes to argue against Truman’s decision.

            Michael Armine is a scientific writer who had a deep interest in the study of the atomic bomb because of his father’s historical background. Armine enjoyed combining his interests and his father’s work, thus fell upon the study of the atomic bomb. After World War II, Armine managed the publicity campaign for the Federation of Atomic Scientists and later was director of public education for Brookhaven Laboratory, a peacetime research center of the Atomic Energy Commission… “He is a consultant for the American Psychological Association, the Air Research and Development Command of the U.S. Air Force, and other scientific agencies.”^[8]

Armine’s accolades support his work in The Great Decision, which highlights the decision making of the Atomic Bomb in World War II. 

Michael Armine’s The Great Decision (1959), is the closest book published to the dropping of both the atomic bombs on Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Armine questions Truman throughout his book to show the uncertainty Truman had during the creation of the atomic bomb. Armine portrays his argument by asking questions throughout the book like, “Why did Truman not know of the A-bomb project when he became president, only 116 days before Hiroshima?”^[9] Pointing out Truman’s flaws and uncertainties throughout the book strengthens the argument of his blindness to the science and the “atomic curtain.”^[10] Armine even questions why Truman had the sole decision and responsibility to drop this atomic bomb when in reality it was an “allied project.”

Truman, not relying on the opinion of other allied nations concerning the atomic bomb dropping raises suspicion on Truman’s thought process and desires. Franklin D. Roosvelt wanted the atomic bomb for the axis powered Nazi Germany and Japanese nations, this threat was believed to be big enough for other nations to back down; the threat of posing this weapon was great enough. However, Truman wanted to use this weapon, twice.              Michael Armine’s interpretation of the atomic bomb dropping supports the idea that Harry Truman wanted to use the bomb, while Franklin D. Roosvelt wanted possession of the atomic bomb. General Eisenhower’s opinion was also squandered as Truman ignored his plea for peace around the world. Armine understands this is a world war; however, the dropping of this bomb led to his own, and Eisenhower’s, belief that this action would increase the threat of an arms race or even nuclear warfare. There was a psychological aspect Armine and Eisenhower believed would be strong enough to force Japan into a surrender rather than risk future conflicts. This is seen in a memorandum sent to General Grooves that the “two aspects of this are (1) obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it is released.”^[11] The psychological factors that played into this decision were enough for leading politicians like FDR and General Eisenhower. The immediate threat posed by this decision was too great a risk for the nation’s safety. 

            Richard Rhodes is an American Historian and author who wrote the book The Making of the Atomic Bomb. Rhodes also won a “Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, which was shortlisted for a Pulitzer Prize in History; and two further volumes on nuclear history.^[12] Rhodes’ many awards and achievements help to establish his credibility regarding the history of the atomic bomb and create a good argument suitably denying President Truman’s decision on dropping two atomic bombs. Rhodes’ well-rounded education helps with his argument in his book The Making of the Atomic Bomb.

            Richard Rhodes monograph, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), is written about forty years after the atomic bomb was dropped and talks about how having an atomic bomb, and its threat, is different than using it on another nation. The threat of nuclear warfare was too great, leading Rhodes to question Truman’s decision strictly on a scientific level. Rhodes describes his idea on how the pace of the making of the atomic bomb is ‘frightening.’ Rhodes says the discovery of microbes is a punishment from God because during the closing days of World War II, “marked a turning point in human history, a point of entry into a new era when humankind for the first time acquired the means of its own destruction.”^[13] For President Truman to make this decision essentially with little information, Rhodes questions why he had the desire to drop two bombs on Japan. Rhodes upholds this view mentioning how the Manhattan Project is only known by scientist peers such as Oppenheimer, Teller, Bohr, and others. General Eisenhower, who was also not fully aware of the Manhattan Project, agrees with Rhodes’ point and describes the bomb as a “physical force, it was morally indifferent and could just as easily serve evil purposes as good.”^[14] While Rhodes talks about the science behind this bomb it’s difficult for him to disagree with this statement because he believes the release of nuclear energy would not only cause mass genocide immediately in Japan, but also lead to the aftereffects of the radiation, causing long term illnesses for Japanese citizens. 

            Rhodes continues to agree with the argument that Truman made an undesirable decision for his U.S. nation because of the threat posed in the future for the U.S. and Japanese citizens. With Rhodes’ knowledge of FDR’s commitment and awareness of the atomic bomb he subscribes to the argument that FDR would not have dropped the atomic bomb. While Rhodes doesn’t directly say this, he mentions how “the release of nuclear energy, and its application to build weapons of mass destruction, has gradually changed how total war is based…”^[15] Even nations who are poorer than others have the means and desire to create nuclear weapons themselves due to the portability of these weapons, and more importantly, how they can act as a defense mechanism for their nations. 

There was a deeper meaning Rhodes waned to portray to the audience; he wanted to show how the bomb was created and how dense this line of work was during the Manhattan Project. However, after considering all of the scientific aspects, he mentions firsthand stories of civilians during the dropping of both of the atomic bombs. These stories suit the argument made against Truman. Rhodes finds it difficult to believe that with Japan on the brink of collapse that FDR, with all of his knowledge of Project Trinity, would have dropped the bomb on a dying nation. These stories consist of survivors who had painful lives, or citizens who survived the initial blast of the atomic bomb but passed away years later. A priest named Father Kopp was standing outside; he was about to head home after a long day of work. Father Kopp suddenly became “aware of the light, felt a wave of heat, and a large blister formed on his hand. A white burn with the formation of a bleb is a grade-four burn…”^[16] His burn took over a year to fully heal, and the bleeding on his calves swelled up, changing his life forever. A junior-college girl described the events she experienced as “the vicinity was in pitch darkness; from the depths of the gloom, bright red flames rise crackling and spread moment by moment. The faces of my friends who just before were working energetically are now burned and blistered, their clothes torn to rags… they remained paralyzed with terror.”^[17] Rhodes added these stories to the end of his monograph to substantiate his claim against President Truman and points out that the physicists who petitioned against the bombing are the real heroes. It struck a nerve with Rhodes that at times the physicists who worked on this project were blamed for the death and trauma experienced by the Japanese citizens. In this case, Rhodes is biased in favor of the physicists as he supported their thoughts and scientific approach throughout the entirety of the Manhattan Project. However, there was little to no support with Truman’s decision, backing the argument that FDR would not have dropped these bombs with the information he had. 

Rhodes’ final criticisms put to shame Truman’s actions on dropping the two atomic bombs on Japan, describing his action as an attempt to gain power amongst the world powers. Rhodes examines Truman’s “lust” for power during World War II and will argue that Truman didn’t just want to end World War II, he wanted to send a message. Rhodes believes Truman knew how his actions would weigh out, thus writing about a children’s point of view on this mass genocide. A seventeen-year-old girl tells her story and says, “I walked past Hiroshima Station… and saw people with their bowels and brains coming out… I saw an old lady carrying a suckling infant in her arms… I saw many children… with dead mothers… I just cannot put into words the horror I felt.”^[18] Another young boy speaks and says “I was walking among dead people…it was like hell. The sight of a living horse burning was striking.”^[19] A young schoolgirl saw “a man without feet, walking on his ankles, she remembers a man with his eyes sticking out about two inches called me by name and I felt sick… people’s bodies were tremendously swollen- you can’t imagine how a big human body can swell up.”^[20] Rhodes brings a completely different aspect to his storytelling with these first-hand stories and points out the obvious to those who supported the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Those who supported the bombing just years after World War II were ashamed of the end of this monograph. Rhodes’ thoughts on

Truman’s goals for dropping the bomb, showing powerhouse nations such as the Soviet Union what the U.S. has, was shameful. For these reasons, the argument is made that FDR would have used the existence of the bomb as a deterrent against a dying Japanese nation, as opposed to the actual employment of the bomb as Truman did.

Secondary educational history teachers would use this topic specifically in their classroom because it is an argumentative topic and affects the U.S. today. Besides secondary educational history teachers using this topic to show students how inquiry-based questions are formed, they can also use this topic to show the after effects of the dropping of two atomic bombs. After World War II came the Cold War, it was a direct impact of the two droppings of the atomic bombs on Japanese cities. Since the Cold War, the whole world has lived in fear of a nuclear war. With that being said, introducing a topic to students on an issue that was 50 years ago and still affects their nation today is one they can grasp. Any time students hear the phrase “nuclear warfare,” they can look no further than the actions the U.S. committed to in 1945. 

Anthony Brown is a British historian who writes about the history of the atomic bomb and British and U.S. military strategies.  Brown was born in Bath, England, he served in the “Royal Air Force. He became a journalist for the ‘Daily Mail’ in London. In 1962, Brown emigrated to Washington, D.C., where he had a career as a journalist.”^[21] With Anthony Brown’s background his contributions to this argument are key to understanding the decision behind the dropping of the atomic bomb on the two Japanese cities. 

Anthony Brown’s, The Secret of the Atomic Bomb (1997), gives insight into the making and the science behind the atomic bomb during the Manhattan Project, while also emphasizing the importance of security amongst the physicists on the testing site. Brown’s spin on his argument is showing how important security was within the Manhattan Project because the information within was dangerous if ascertained by other nations. The author believes that the creation of this bomb was important for a U.S. victory over the Axis powered nations; however, as Brown wrote this book fifty years after the dropping of two atomic bombs it helps him understand the science behind the bomb, understanding how the threat of possessing the bomb was exactly what they needed. Brown would argue against Truman’s decision because opening up this power to the world is dangerous. The science behind the bomb such as nuclear fission, impurities, and uranium led Brown to argue this great power needed to be kept in check, and most importantly remain in the hands of the U.S. elite.

Brown will argue against Truman’s decision to drop the two bombs on Japanese cities strictly because of the threat of exposing the world to this type of warfare. Brown mentions throughout his book how the physicists panicked during the Manhattan Project because they were in a virtual race against the clock with Nazi Germany. This led Brown to believe at times the physicists were sloppy, leading to dangerous situations of either exposure within the camp or a mistake in the making of the bomb. The physicists encountered many obstacles which caused them to “change certain divisions that work on specific aspects of the bomb. The changing of divisions such as G, X, and R led to the Technical Board Committee to deem parts of this program inadequate to handle technical problems within the laboratory.”^[22] The reason Brown mentions this sense of panic within the camp is because of the connection made at the end of his book concerning the uncertainty of President Truman. Once this bomb was successfully created, news of a spy surfaced within the Manhattan Project, and when Truman heard of this, Brown believed from then on, that any decision seemed drastic. 

Brown believed the information on the threat of the atomic bomb to the world and the nation’s future was ignored by Truman, thus leading to a hasty decision of using the bomb on Japan. One of Brown’s chapters is named “The New Project,” and this chapter is all about the decisions made in the summer of 1945. With Truman’s limited information on the atomic bomb, he explains why a president, such as FDR, would have used the bomb as a threat, mostly because he knew of the long-lasting danger posed by its very existence. FDR was aware that a possible “chain reaction does or does not go depends on the result of a competition among four processes: (1) escape; (2) non-fission capture by uranium; (3) non fission capture by impurities; (4) fission on captured impurities.”²⁴ The main reason for FDR was to have made the bomb and use it against Nazi Germany and Japan. Although FDR was alive during the collapse of Nazi Germany, the bomb hadn’t been finished yet and other measures would have been explored. This can be seen in a memorandum that mentions, “at one point the President raised the question of whether this means should actually be used against the Japanese or whether it should be used only as a threat with full-scale experimentation in this country. He did so, I believe, in connection with Bohr’s apparent urging that a threat be employed against Germany, which would of course, I think, be futile.…”^[23] FDR avoided this question a good number of times because it was too early to determine if this action was necessary. There were full beliefs from all of the authors above that with the information FDR had received from physicists on the Manhattan Project he would not have made the decision to deploy the bomb. FDR would have preferred to use the atomic bomb as a threat, while Truman, as Brown mentions, wanted to use the bomb on a full-scale level showing how powerful the U.S. can be.

Brown mentions how propaganda was used throughout Japan the day after the first bombing of Hiroshima. The main goal of using propaganda was for the Japanese nation to show how evil the U.S. was, almost making it seem like Japan had done nothing wrong during World War II. The Japanese used this propaganda effectively because they wanted to establish a bias towards their victimization, when in reality the aggressive action by the Japanese constituted a major factor in the U.S. decision to join World War II. However, some of this use of propaganda was truly a call for help and this supports Brown’s argument against President Truman. The Japanese showed the world the massacre they endured with the “distribution of 500,000 copies of Japanese newspapers containing stories and pictures of the atomic-bomb strike.”^[24] This propaganda campaign continued and small 15-minute intervals of Japanese broadcasts during the first bombing of Japan made it to the public eye. Many also question whether or not Truman gave the Japanese enough time to surrender as they dropped the second bomb only days after the first. President Truman defends his decision-making and claims he made this decision to save the lives of U.S soldiers and end the war as soon as possible. Whether or not historians believe this is true, it is difficult to argue with the fact that President Truman was warned by many physicists that he should proceed with caution in making this decision. 

Throughout Michael Armine’s, The Great Decision (1959), there is key information provided that disagrees with Truman’s viewpoint of the dropping of two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities.The basis of his question comes strictly from the average person’s point of view because he asks the simple questions such as questioning Truman’s decision with such limited information, and whether Truman ever consulted with other Allied powered nations or American generals. Armine asks these valid questions; however, due to the date of publication he hardly has any facts to validate his statements. Armine is simply asking questions, while the other two books listed above talk about the importance of the science behind the bomb, information those authors received due to publishing their books forty plus years later. During this time about 80% of American citizens believed the dropping of the atomic bomb was justified; however, these opinions were based on limited information about this bomb.

Armine’s thoughts on this bomb shouldn’t be dismissed, the questions he asks are crucial to American history, but he fails to provide any scientific backing.  He was still asking questions such as “is this bomb called a super bomb? Should the bomb be dropped, as a demonstration, on uninhabited territory? Could other countries make such bombs?”^[25] Even when Armine does take a statistical approach, he mentions how the science behind this atomic bomb should serve as protection to the U.S. but doesn’t address how dangerous these substances are. The closet Armine approaches the fear factor in this book is when he mentions how “Szilard and his colleagues were thinking of the atom bomb in 1939. In 1945 they were having nightmares of the atom bomb in World War III.”^[26] Unfortunately, the closest Armine gets into the dangers of the atomic bomb is talking about how the physicists feared its being used in a future World War III conflict. However, the questions he asks are important for the reader’s information on the atomic bomb, thus disagreeing with Truman’s plans to drop two bombs on a weak Japanese nation.  

Both Anthony Brown’s, The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1977), and Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), have similar methodology due to their dates of publication being within ten years of each other. Both authors mention the science behind their reasoning for opposing the bomb droppings, and as a result, they are slightly biased to be against President Truman. As both authors had forty plus years to write their books, many memorandums and committee reports were made available to the public on a large scale. While this information is important for any decision on the bomb, it was used too heavily throughout the books and failed to ask any deep-rooted questions on how other physicists, politicians, and allies felt. After researching the dropping of the atomic bomb, it’s important to get the full picture to truly understand the reasoning behind it. If the reader read only these two books, The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb and The Making of the Atomic Bomb, they’d fail to understand the reasoning and support for dropping the two bombs. The argument being made is that President Truman made a quick and undesirable decision to end World War II immediately, however there should be no argument presented that Truman made this action with thoughts of vengeance or anger. If someone read these two books, they’d assume President Truman was an unfit president to follow FDR. The audience understood FDR’s backing of the development of the atomic bomb and the information he received during his presidency was far greater than  Truman’s. This shouldn’t be the end all and be all; President Truman and his staff believed the ending of this war was crucial, and they had the best interest of the U.S. at heart, at the time. 

During the summer of 1945 President Truman believed the dropping of the two atomic bombs was a fit decision to end World War II and bring home American troops. However, the benefits of The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb and The Making of the Atomic Bomb, show how this decision would prove costly in the future. Unlike Michael Armine’s, The Great Decision, these two books talk about the dangers Truman understood might be incurred by Japan and other responding nations. This viewpoint helps any learner understand that the actions of President Truman resulted in consequences for the U.S. for decades to follow. Rhodes believed that all factors weren’t looked at by President Truman because he had an uneasy pressure to end

World War II. Truman also needed to justify the money invested into the atomic bomb project, “the bomb was also to be used to pay for itself, to justify to congress the investment of $2 billion…”^[27] President Truman’s decision to drop two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities seemed careless. There was no regard for how this decision could pan out in the future. Even Allied leader Winston Churchill agreed with President Truman and summarized the atomic bomb use in World War II as such, “to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after all our tolls and perils, a miracle of deliverance.”^[28] To use the words “at the cost of a few explosions” summarizes the thought process between the two leaders. There is no disagreement that the Allied powers paid their tolls during World War II, but to cause suffering of hundreds of thousands of citizens in Japan shouldn’t add up to “a few explosions.” As mentioned before, there was an unnecessary desire for Truman to end World War II the way he did as he didn’t account for the near future. 

As Rhodes continues to talk about Truman’s decision to drop two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities, he mentions how this barbaric choice was opposed by generals and staff who were linked close to the atomic bomb in the summer of 1945. There was a different psychological feeling the president had at the time, including American citizens they felt, “free to use and compelled to use a new weapon of mass destruction on civilians in undefended cities. It was the psychology of the American people. I. I. Rabi, an American physicist who discovered nuclear magnetic resonance, explained how eventually it wasn’t just the military involved with this decision, the decision was “backed by the American people.” There was impatience looming in America that merged with the desire to end the war, that supported this decision. Thus, explaining why the Gallup Poll taken in 1945 showed that over 80% of American citizens supported the bomb droppings in Japan. Even after the two bombs were dropped The Smyth Report, the official report on the development of the atomic bomb under the auspices of the United States Government, was released and stated that “the average citizen cannot be expected to understand clearly how an atomic bomb is constructed or how it works but there is in this country a substantial group of engineers and scientists who can understand such things and who can explain the potentialities of atomic bombs to their fellow citizens.”^[29] To use the backing of American citizens for the decision to drop two atomic bombs was unjust. It’s also interesting to Rhodes that U.S. citizens would allow two bombs to be dropped on Japan that would kill thousands of Japanese citizens. 

Anthony Brown backs Rhodes’ claims on President Truman’s actions being costly because it puts the U.S. nation in an immediate threat. As Brown talks about the science behind the atomic bomb, he mentions there being no end to this destruction. Brown argues that other power-house nations will continue this violence in the future with their own bombs while also finding possibilities to get bigger, or worse weapons. Brown’s take on releasing an atomic bomb into the world isn’t just the fear of another nation recreating it, but the fear of making a mistake.

There is a mentioning of how the “development of means predicting accurately the critical mass of active materials,”^[30] and how a miscalculation of certain scattering data such as fission experiments could be deadly. Brown believes this is why the patent for the U.S. Manhattan Project took so long to be accepted because of the fear of worldly catastrophe. With Truman showing how powerful this bomb is, every nation in the world would want to recreate this invention and, in the process, destroy the world. Not only does it tease the U.S. competitors to make this deadly weapon, but in the process, they can destroy the world. The two authors suggest not using the bombs, rather presenting them as intimidation. Granted, both authors understand the indubitable desire for other nations to match the U.S. and create an atomic bomb for themselves, but there’s an argument to be made that there is less of a threat the bomb would be used by another nation against the U.S. if Truman decided not to drop the two bombs on Japan. 

            The argument made throughout this paper is that Harry Truman wanted to use the bomb for an unnecessary desire to end World War II against a weak Axis powered alliance, and that Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted possession of the bomb to avoid the continuation of World War II and a future arms race. The historiography speaks on this decision as fifty years’ worth of information confirms the physicists’ and politicians’ fears of a new means of mass destruction and an all-out arms race. This type of issue created a chain reaction conceived of by only a few who were shown to be correct. This chain reaction wasn’t scientific, it was political. Every nation had the means to create their own atomic bomb as they witnessed the first one being used on a dying Japanese nation during World War II. The two bombs dropped by President Truman killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese citizens and was considered mass genocide. Not only was there fear other nations would create this weapon, but there was also fear they could destroy the earth in the process of making the bomb and testing it. Within many pieces of evidence found concerning the question of whether or not to drop the atomic bomb on another nation, came caution that made President Truman aware. Truman, who was left in the dark about the atomic bomb until a few months before dropping one, had the means to end World War II without looking at the consequences. FDR had the means to use this bomb, when need be, a decision he would have gone against as evidenced by many memorandums and petitions received about the dangers of the atomic bomb. It is obvious the Allied powers would have won without these bombs, there were other strategies to be employed, such as naval blockades. These alternate strategies would have saved hundreds of thousands of Japanese citizens; therefore, fortifying the argument against President Truman’s decision. 

            Secondary educational history teachers would successfully use this argument to show two objectives for students. The first objective for students to learn is the beauty behind inquiry-based questions. History can be seen through any lens, as long as there is proper evidence to back the claim. To get a full understanding of history, a historian, or even student for that matter, should understand there are different angels of a “historical fact” or “historical event.” History is one of the only subjects where this is no definitive answer, there needs to be proof to back the argument. The second objective is for the topic itself, the dropping of two atomic bombs by the U.S. onto Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This is a prime reason for the threat of nuclear warfare today. Despite the atomic bomb being made by the Soviet Union just shortly after the U.S. dropped the bombs, all fingers point to the U.S. for introducing this type of power to the world. The U.S. is the only nation to drop an atomic bomb on another nation with aims to destroy them. J. Robert Oppenheimer was not just afraid of the creation of the atomic bomb, but who would eventually have their hands on one. The atomic bomb is a means for mass destruction and something that every person in the world may one day fear will destroy life as they know it. For students to understand how this history can affect their lives today is something worth teaching, and for the students, worth understanding. Learning from past mistakes is a crucial part of history, and for Harry Truman he may have made a mistake that will affect his nation decades later. 

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